In the federal economy like India intergovernmental transfer policies affect the state revenue and expenditure policies. This paper provides a theoretical model of determining optimal fiscal policy of the state governments in India. State's optimum fiscal policy depends on the rules applied by transferring agencies in transferring funds to the sub national governments. Three important criteria revenue effort, deficit financing and distance criterion are considered to estimate the weight assigned to these criteria. The comparison of actual state own revenue and expenditure policies with the optimum policy reveals that states are spending more than estimated optimum level and collecting revenues less than the optimum level. The deviation of actual values from the optimum values also give us some idea regarding to which direction the state governments should change its existing revenue and expenditure policies. 
Introduction
The constitution of India provides independent revenue raising and spending power to both the central and the state governments. It also admits the existence of vertical imbalances in taxing power. The expenditure responsibilities of the state governments on the other hand are higher. The constitution thus directs the central government to transfer resources. Transfers by the central government are meant to bridge the gap between resources required by states to meet their assigned responsibilities and the resources they can raise themselves.
Three-tier transfer mechanism exists in India. The central government transfers funds in India via Finance Commission, Planning Commission and discretionary transfers through various union ministries and agencies. Low taxing power and high expenditure responsibilities make the state governments dependent on the central government for resources. Transfer from the centre covers large part of revenue of the state governments. In this chapter we have studied the impact of intergovernmental transfer on the state fiscal performance.
The review of literature (Rao and Singh (1998a) , Rao (1998b) , Rao (2000) , Bajpai and Sachs (1999) , Sen and Trebesch (2004) ) on state finances and the intergovernmental transfer mechanism in India indicates that most of the studies have examined the vertical and horizontal imbalances in the federal transfer mechanism and how the design of transfer system can be improved to distribute resources equitably. Ma (1997) evaluated the intergovernmental transfer mechanism of different countries and suggested methods of determining fiscal capacities of provinces.
On the tax side of the state finances, Coondoo et al. (2000) , Rao (1979) and Oommen (1987) have estimated the tax capacity of the states and the tax effort given by the states in collecting revenue at the state level. Coondoo, Majumder, Mukherjee and Neogi (2001) examined the relative tax performance of the states in India for the period 1986-87 to 1996-97. Sen (1997) also calculated the tax effort index of various categories of taxes for 15 major states in India for the period 1991-92 to 1993-94. Rao (2002) and Bajpai and Sachs (1999) examined the situation of state finances in India. Rao (2002) finds that situation of state finances deteriorated after 1990-91. State finances in India are adversely affected by low buoyancy of central transfer. Bajpai and Sachs (1999) find that reform of the state fiscal system is necessary in order to reduce expenditure and increase revenue. They find that inefficient intergovernmental transfer mechanism in India is responsible for fiscal indiscipline at the state level. Rajaraman and Visstha (2000) find that an increase in non-matching grants to panchayats affects the tax effort negatively in districts of Kerala. GR (2001) argued that the negative relationship between tax effort and grants is arrived by Rajaraman and Visstha (2000) because of their assumption that population size represents tax capacity. Assuming the same tax effort over the districts in Kerala they have shown that the negative relationship between tax revenues and grants obtained by Rajaraman and Visstha (2000) rather represent the negative relationship between grants and taxable capacity.
The paper by Sinelnikov, Kadotchnikov, Trounin and Schkrebela (2001) relates the rules applied in intergovernmental transfer mechanism for the Russian economy and its impact on the regional optimal tax and expenditure. Another paper by Dahlby (2004) has derived the optimal tax and expenditure ratios considering borrowing as one of the sources of financing deficit.
Sinelnikov, Kadotchnikov, Trounin and Schkrebela (2001) in their paper considered that expenditure on public goods and services is financed by taxes and transfers and in Dahlby (2004) intergovernmental transfer mechanism is not considered. Our theoretical model follows from these two papers where we have addressed the impact of rules applied in transferring resources on the optimum fiscal performance of a state considering the fact that deficit is financed by borrowing. Our model is different from these two models in the sense that in our model we have considered the role of transfer along with the case that after devolution of transfers, deficit is financed by market borrowing. The transfer formula used in this model is also relevant for Indian economy. We have tested the theoretical model developed in this chapter using the state level data from the Indian economy. Dahlby (2004) finds that public debt ratio affects the optimal tax ratio but it does not affect the optimal expenditure ratio. But in our model we find that both the revenue and expenditure ratios depend on public debt ratio.
In our study we have assumed a simple formula of transferring resources to the states and derived the optimum revenue and expenditure of a state from the utility maximizing principle.
Instead of examining the relationship between total transfer and fiscal performance of a state we have tried to show how weights given by transferring agencies to revenue effort index, deficit financing criterion and distance of per capita income criterion affect the optimum revenue and expenditure of a state.
Formula used and weight assigned to various criteria in transferring resources by several Finance Commissions seems to be somewhat arbitrary and subjective. As written in the "Memorandum to The Twelfth Finance Commission of the Government of Gujarat" 1 in p21 that "The weights assigned by the various Finance Commissions to the parameters used in the formula of horizontal distribution does not seem to flow from any comprehensive theoretical framework. If there exists a scientific basis for deriving these numbers, none of the Finance
Commissions has cared to explain it properly in their reports and hence it gives an impression that they are arbitrary and subjective. In a note appended to the main report of the Fourth Finance Commission, the chairman, Dr. P.V. Rajamannar, had remarked that the selection of a particular set of factors and weights assigned to them for determining the shares has largely remained subjective and continues to be "a gamble on the personal views of the five persons or a majority of them"." In our study we have used a simple formula for transferring resources and statistically estimated the coefficients associated with selected criteria.
Thus objective of this study is to find out the weight assigned by transferring agencies to three important criteria in per capita transfer of funds. Having identified these parameters we have estimated the utility maximizing level of optimum revenue and expenditure of a few selected states in India. The states that we have selected are Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal and period of analysis is 1981 to 2001.
The chapter is organized in the following way. Section 4.2 summarizes the criteria used by several agencies in transferring funds in India, section 4.3 provides the theoretical model of estimating optimum revenue and expenditure of a state, section 4.4 explains the methodology used for empirical analysis, section 4.5 represents the data source and variables, section 4.6
analyses empirical results and section 4.7 provides the conclusions derived.
Rules applied in transferring resources in India
In analyzing intergovernmental transfer mechanism in India it is very important to know the criteria used by different finance and planning commissions. In India, Finance Commission The remaining 25 percent of transfers were made on the basis of per capita state domestic product (SDP) based on the following formula. 20 percent was given only to states with less than average per capita SDP on the basis of the inverse formula; and the remaining 5 percent according to the distance formula. The inverse formula is given by:
which is inversely related to the per capita income of the state. The distance formula is given by: 
Theoretical model
Literature on intergovernmental transfer mechanism in India also recommended that formula used in transferring funds should be simple and should not create any fiscal disincentive in a state. In the previous section we have examined first the different criteria used by several Finance and Planning commissions over the period. To fulfill the above objective we have selected three important criteria such as, population, own revenue effort of the state and gap filling to define the formula in transferring resources in India.
Instead of transfers by three different bodies separately we have analyzed the central government's transfers as a whole. Evaluating formula used by different Planning and Finance
commissions it is observed that population, revenue effort, deficit filling and the distance criteria are the important criteria used by transferring agencies in India. In our model we assume a simple formula for transferring resources to a state.
We assume here that per capita transfer to a state depends on revenue effort index, actual deficit of the state and the distance criterion. Revenue effort index is measured by the actual revenue 2 to revenue capacity of the state, actual deficit is calculated as the difference between actual expenditure and actual own revenue and the distance of per capita income from highest per capita income is calculated using the formula stated below (1a). Thus transfer to a particular state at any time period t is assumed to follow the following formula
where
2 Actual own revenue is defined as the sum of own tax and non-tax revenue on revenue account and non-debt capital receipt on capital account.
Here i indicates ith state, it
Tr is the transfer to the ith state at time t, it P is the population of the ith state at time t, Ti and it T are actual own revenue collection and the estimated revenue capacity respectively of the ith state at time t, Git is the total expenditure by the ith state at period The budget constraint faced by the state government in a federal country like India is as follows:
Here we assume that
Here we assume that the government borrows a constant proportion of its income in each period thus t t t b Y B = . We also assume that t Y grows at a constant annual rate of γ . Thus we
To determine the optimal own revenue and expenditure in a federal country like India where certain proportion of revenue comes from central transfer we make the following assumptions:
Same formula is used in transferring resources to all the states.
(ii) The decisions concerning both the state budget revenue formation and the procedures of financing the corresponding expenditures are made by the state governments.
(iii) Government expenditure and revenue collection in real terms are certain proportion of its real output. It is assumed that gY G = and Y T τ = , where G: real government expenditure, T: real revenue collection (tax, non-tax and non-debt capital receipts), Y:
real output, g is the government real expenditure as a proportion to the real output, τ is the real revenue collection as proportion to the real output. Here T is not a function as used in case of direct tax.
(iv) Public transfers are not included into regional budget expenditures.
(v) Borrowing taken in period (t-1) is repaid in period t.
(vi) Objective of the state governments is to maximize utility of the economic agents which depends on its own expenditure and revenue policy. Increase in real expenditure increases utility directly and increase in real revenue collection affects utility through its impact on reduction of real output available in the hands of the economic agents. Thus utility is function of public goods and private goods consumption. G represents the public goods consumption while private goods consumption is proxied by the real output less the output taken away by the government as tax (Y-T). Utility function is defined as follows:
Thus as g increases that increases regional utility and as τ increases that takes away certain proportion of real output from the hands of the economic agents. Thus 
Thus, state authorities' optimum choice depends upon the rules applied to regional transfer allocation, that is δ β α , , .
Thus optimum revenue to output ratio depends positively on revenue capacity ratio and negatively on higher transfer received on the basis of distance criterion, rate of borrowing (b) in each period, rate of growth of real output and constant rate of repayment of borrowing as a proportion to total government expenditure (θ) . This means that the state with higher the revenue capacity can collect more revenue and poorer the state, the more is the transfer received by the state and lower is optimum revenue collection. Again more it can borrow lower is the state's revenue collection.
Higher the revenue capacity ratio lower is the transfer received and thus lower is the optimum expenditure to output ratio. Poorer the state is higher will be transfer received on the basis of distance criterion and this will affect the optimum expenditure to output ratio positively.
More the state can borrow the more it will be able to spend. Thus borrowing rate affects the optimum expenditure to output ratio positively.
Now it is important to check how weights assigned to different criteria affects the optimum revenue and expenditure policy of the state. Increase in weight given to α implies a state can receive more funds if it gives more effort in raising own revenue. Again higher the value of β it indicates transferring agencies are giving positive weight to actual expenditure net of own revenue collection of the state. More weight to δ indicates that instead of giving more weight to state's own revenue and expenditure policy, transferring agency is giving more weight to whether the state is poor or not.
Impact of weights assigned to different criteria by the transferring agency on optimum fiscal policy of the state are discussed below.
, since 1 < τ and 1 P < β As the transferring agency attaches more weight to revenue effort criterion that increases the optimum revenue to output ratio and decreases the optimum expenditure to output ratio of the state. More weight to revenue effort criterion will induce the state government to raise its revenue collection to get the same level of transfer. Given the revenue effort of the government more weight to α will increase the revenue side of the government budget and thus given the budget constraint optimum expenditure to output ratio will increase. This means that as α increases optimum policy of the government will be to raise revenue more. Now as state's revenue collection increases this will have negative influence on regional utility. Now to increase utility the state government's optimum policy will be to increase expenditure to output ratio.
Impact of increase in weight assigned to deficit criterion is discussed below.
[ ]
Higher weight assigned to deficit financing criterion optimum expenditure rate increases.
Impact of weight assigned to deficit criterion may increase, decrease or keep optimum revenue policy of the government unchanged. If transfer received on the basis of revenue capacity of the state is larger than that on the basis of deficit financing criterion and borrowing rates of the state government then optimum revenue policy of the government will be to increase its own revenue collection and vice versa. Now we will discuss how weight assigned to distance criterion affects optimum fiscal policy of the state.
Increase in weight assigned to the distance criterion indicates that more weight are given to factors other than state own expenditure and revenue policy. Poorer the state is, more funds will be transferred to the state that increases the value of the revenue side of the budget. Given its expenditure policy, optimum policy of the government will be to reduce revenue to output ratio.
Given the revenue effort as transfer to the state increases it is optimum to spend more.
Methodology

Empirical Methodology used in this chapter
Ordinary least square method is used on pooled data taken from five selected states in India over the period 1981 to 2001. We have estimated the parameters of the transfer formula using the following regression model.
where D1=Andhra Pradesh, D2=Karnataka, D3= Orissa, D4=Tamil Nadu, D5= West Bengal. Di=1 for ith state, =0 otherwise, i u is the random disturbance term. To estimate the coefficients of the above model and eliminate the problem of dummy variable trap we have excluded D3 that is, Orissa and applied ordinary least square method to the above equation.
( ) t P Tr is the per capita transfer at time period t, t ) T T ( − is defied as the revenue effort by the state over and above their revenue capacity at time period t, (G-T) t is the difference between the total public expenditure and own revenue collection of the state. DI t is the distance of per capita income of the state from highest per capita income of fifteen major states in India.
To find out whether the error in prediction is significantly different from zero or not the pair difference t-test is used. The test statistic that we have used is n / s 0 e t 1 n 1 n ,
where n is the number of pairs or number of differences and s n-1 is the sample standard deviation of e for n-1 observations. Using the estimated coefficients from the above model optimum revenue to output ratio and the optimum expenditure to output ratio are calculated using equations (5) and (6). Actual rates are compared with the optimum rates in order to find out the possible direction of fiscal policy at the state level.
Mean of the absolute difference between actual and predicted values relative to actual values is used as a measure of mean relative error in prediction. Thus mean relative error in prediction is calculated using the following formula: x is the optimum value of i x , n is number of observations.
Methodology used by Finance Commission in calculating tax capacity
The way the Finance Commission has estimated the taxable capacity of a state is explained below. 
Methodology used in this paper in calculating revenue capacity of state
Using the estimated taxable capacities we have estimated the taxable capacities to other years within the period 1981 to 2001. First, we have found the actual ratio of non-tax and tax revenue at constant prices for various years. Then three years moving average method is used.
Average of these averages is used to calculate the total revenue (tax + non-tax) capacities of the state.
Data Source and Variables
Data Source:
This section summarizes the data used in this study. 
Empirical Analysis
Estimation of per capita transfer
The regression results are summarized as follows: We have tested whether the mean error in prediction is equal to zero or not. The error in prediction (e) is the difference between the actual and the predicted values. The pair difference ttest is used for this purpose. The test statistic used is Ho: mean (e) = 0
Ha: mean (e)< 0 Ha: mean ≠0 Ha: mean > 0 Pr(T < t) = 0.5000 Pr(T > t) =1.000 Pr(T > t) = 0.5000
The difference between actual and the predicted value are not significantly different from 
. Comparison of optimum and actual revenue and expenditure ratio
The optimum revenue-output rates and the optimum expenditure-output rates are derived from the following condition 8 :
The regression of the following equation
for Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal separately for all t=1981 to 2001.where
We observe that fit is very good as the value of adjusted 2 R is above 0.95 in all the five cases. The estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero for all the selected five states.
Thus the actual data satisfies the relationship from which the optimum revenue-output and expenditure-output ratios are derived. The optimum values estimated using the equations of optimum revenue-output and expenditure-output (equations (5) and (6)) can be well considered as the optimum values.
Using the above relation (8) average optimum revenue to GSDP ratio varies from 6.75 percent in West Bengal to 12.90 percent in Karnataka. Again we find that on an average optimum expenditure to GSDP ratio varies from 11.34 percent in West Bengal to 17.00 percent in Orissa. In all the selected states it is found that utility maximizing expenditure to GSDP ratio is lower that of revenue to GSDP ratio.
To check how states have performed over the sample period 1981 to 2001 we have compared the actual rates to their optimum values. The comparison between the actual and the optimum revenue to GSDP ratio indicates that all the selected states are raising revenue less than their optimum level. Again on the expenditure side it is found that actual expenditure to GSDP ratio is much higher than the optimum rates. (See table 4) . The difference in optimum expenditure to GSDP ratio can be attributed to the difference in the estimated value of ωwhich measure the weight assigned to public good consumption as we find a high rank correlation between these two factors. The difference in optimum revenue to GSDP ratio on the other hand cannot be explained by only one term. This is result of all these factors.
Mean ( Mean absolute deviation of actual rates from their optimum rates relative to the actual rates are calculated to find out how far the state's actual fiscal policy is from their optimum policy. We observe that such a variation in expenditure to GSDP ratio ranges from 4.97 percent in Karnataka to 12.51 percent in Orissa. Mean absolute deviation of actual revenue to GSDP ratio from optimum revenue-GSDP ratio relative to actual revenue-GSDP ratio varies from 13.68 percent in Karnataka to 42.51 percent in Orissa.
Here we find out whether the deviation of actual rates from their optimum rates is significantly different from zero or not. We define the difference between actual and the optimum revenue-GSDP ratio by e (T/Y) and the difference between actual and the optimum public expenditure to GSDP ratio is denoted by e (G/Y). We have tested whether the mean e (T/Y) and the mean e (G/Y) are significantly different from zero or not. We reject the null hypothesis at 95 percent level of confidence in both the cases. But we fail to reject e (G/Y) =0 at 90 percent level of confidence. Thus we observe that in all the selected states in India they are neither raising revenue nor spending at the optimum utility maximizing level. Ho: mean (e) = 0
Ha: mean (e)< 0 Ha: mean ≠ 0 Ha: mean > 0 Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 Ho: mean (e) = 0
Ha: mean (e)< 0 Ha: mean ≠ 0 Ha: mean > 0 Pr(T < t) = 0.9562 Pr(T > t) = 0.0877 Pr(T > t) =0 .0438
Above analysis suggests that the state governments can take the optimum values calculated here as the benchmark and change their actual policy accordingly. From this study we find that there should be reduction in expenditure to GSDP ratio and increase in revenue to GSDP ratio in all the five selected states in India.
Conclusion
A model of determination of optimum revenue and expenditure in a federal economy like India has been developed. The model shows how the intergovernmental transfer allocation rule affects the utility maximizing level of revenue to output and expenditure to output ratios of the sub-national governments. The model is developed considering the transfer principle used by different transferring agencies in India.
The optimum revenue and expenditure policy of a state government are found to be dependent on the weight assigned to different criteria by the federal government in transferring funds to the state governments. Changing the weights assigned to different criteria federal government can change the utility maximizing revenue to output and expenditure to output rates.
Using pooled regression analysis on data taken from five selected states and for the period 1981 to 2001 we have estimated the weights assigned to various criteria by the transferring agencies. These coefficients are thus statistically estimated not arbitrarily chosen.
All the coefficients are found to be significantly different from zero at 5 percent level of significance. All the dummy variables are also found to be significant at 5 percent level of significance. As we have assumed in the theoretical part all the coefficients are found to be positive in sign.
We Appendix 1: Derivation of optimum revenue and expenditure ratio
The problem is to 
